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Commentary: Made in China and the new world of secondary resource recovery 
Nicky Gregson & Mike Crang 
 
On 18 July 2017 the Chinese government informed the World Trade Organisation of its 
intention, by year end, to ban imports of recovered mixed paper, recycled plastic, textiles 
and vanadium slag. In April 2018 China extended that ban to another 32 categories of used 
goods and materials, including scrap metal. Another 16 categories are banned from the end 
of 2020 and new standards applied to others. Suddenly, waste and recycling had catapulted 
from industries that few cared much about to the top of the agenda of the primary body 
governing global trade (www.resource-recycling.com – 27 March 2018) and onto the desks 
of municipalities and governments across the world. Why? Because in 2015 and 2016, the 
last available official figures show China (often via Hong Kong) imported at least 48.2 and 
46.7 million tonnes, respectively, in the customs categories that include the affected wastes 
(comtrade.un.org). 
China’s ban has triggered a crisis in the governance of global waste flows. It marks a 
fundamental challenge to the spatial fix that has characterised secondary resource recovery 
since the 1990s. In broad terms, that saw goods and materials declared waste in the Global 
North flow to China and the Global South, to be sold as second-hand goods, for 
reconditioning or repair, or to be recovered as cheap materials for further manufacturing 
(Tranberg-Hansen, 2000; Iles, 2004; Rivoli, 2005; Gregson et al. 2010; Lepawsky & McNabb, 
2010; Gregson et al. 2012; Minter, 2013; Brooks, 2015; Lepawsky, 2015). Paying attention to 
waste and recycling alters prevailing accounts of Global North and Global South. Inverting 
the expected trade patterns, buyers and traders from China and the Global South harvest 
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the wastes of the Global North (Abimbola, 2012; Alexander and Reno, 2012; Brooks, 2012; 
Minter, 2013). Further, global resource recovery can be seen to be about meeting demand 
in production, rather than dumping waste on the environments and peoples of the Global 
South as global environmental justice literatures suggest (Clapp, 2001; BAN, 2002; Pellow, 
2007; c.f. Lora-Wainwright, 2017). China’s ban, however, signals that a major reworking of 
the economic geography of global resource recovery is in process.    
In under a year, the Chinese government has thrown the global recycling industry into 
disarray. In banning these imports, China is shifting from being the metaphorical equivalent 
of the world’s vacuum cleaner, hoovering up the majority of what the developed world 
declares to be rubbish, to being a highly selective importer of certain categories and grades 
of recoverable materials and a major generator and exporter of post-consumer discards. For 
instance, China is emerging as a major exporter of textiles and used clothing, with Chinese-
manufactured and styled clothing increasingly prominent in African used-clothing markets 
(Postrel & Minter, 2018).  
Current discourse in the Global North trying to explain the China ban (e.g. House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee, 2018) points to a supply-demand logic, 
specifically the substitution of domestically generated waste for externally harvested, as 
rising levels of domestic consumption have led to increased levels of domestically generated 
post-consumer discard. Other commentators argue that goods made in China for domestic 
consumption are manufactured to poor standards and are a source of poor quality recyclate 
(@AdamMinter – 4 May 2018). They highlight that Chinese goods made for global export 
often use higher quality materials. It is the latter materials that matter most for secondary 
resource recovery. If one accepts these arguments, the supply side is not the main driver 
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behind the China ban. Instead there is a need to look to the demand side, particularly at 
manufacturing. In 2015 the Chinese government launched its Made in China programme. 
Alongside an ambitious plan to upgrade production, moving it up the value chain, it 
recognised the poor quality of Chinese production for domestic consumption, and 
announced a parallel ambition that 95% of consumer goods manufactured for the domestic 
market will be at international standards by 2020.  
The effect of the political commitment to the wholesale upgrading of Chinese 
manufacturing will be felt acutely in the secondary processing agglomerations that have 
emerged organically in China since the 1990s (Tong and Wang, 2004). They are 
geographically proximate to the main South China ports and are heavily reliant on imports 
harvested from the Global North. An estimated 90% of materials passing through them are 
derived from OECD countries. Each cluster is dedicated to particular materials recovery 
streams. For example, Luqiao (an e-scrap centre) comprises 44 state-certified importers, 172 
firms, 50 dismantling sites, 7 specialised markets, 3000 disassembly enterprises and over 
2000 ‘self-employed entrepreneurs’ (Chi et al. 2014). These labour intensive industries, 
however, have no place in the imaginary that informs current economic policy in China. 
Indeed, their presence is a barrier to China’s upgrading ambitions.   
In the remainder of this commentary we draw on ‘grey’ literature and trade press to provide 
1) a synthesis of the policy developments that are currently upturning global resource 
recovery and consider their ramifications within China. 1  2) Taking the UK as our main case, 
                                                          
1 Key sources for China’s policy trajectory are: www.resource-recycling.com ; www.waste360.com; 
www.letsrecycle.co.uk; www.recyclinginternational.com. Primary news stories are cited in the references.  
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we show what China’s ban means for states accustomed for decades to having China absorb 
their post-consumer discards. 3) We close by suggesting some research priorities in light of 
these developments.      
China’s Green Fence and National Sword: protectionism in the service of ecological 
modernisation and economic upgrading 
Although China has been talking of sustainable development (kechixu fazhan) since the 
1990s, responses to previous scandals and exposés of poor practices in the recycling sector 
had been noisy but superficial, with promises of action and new regulations that were 
largely unenforced (Schulz 2018).  In 2012 at the 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping declared a 
new strategic goal - ‘Building a Beautiful China’. That formed the rallying call for an 
‘ecological civilisation’ (shengtai wenming).  The first warning tremors of the current crisis in 
the governance of global waste flows then came in February 2013, when China imposed the 
‘Green Fence’. This comprised unprecedented inspections of imported ‘scrap’ materials to 
assess whether their quality met national standards. In the first year of Green Fence’s 
operation 70% of inbound containers carrying scrap were inspected, leading to major delays 
in ports, shortages in downstream supply chains, reductions in import licences and knock-on 
difficulties for those seeking to sell recovered materials in the global commodity markets. 
Green Fence imposed a contamination threshold of 1.5%/bale, meaning any bale found 
containing more than 1.5% ‘non-target’ material (e.g. plastic in paper) would be rejected. An 
estimated 800,000 tonnes of material were rejected in the first six months (and sent back, 
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at cost, to shippers), whilst 247 importing companies saw their import licences suspended 
(The Guardian, 27 Oct. 2013)  
In February 2017 Green Fence was superseded by National Sword. That policy flagged a 
crackdown on ‘foreign garbage smuggling’, with a focus on e-waste, industrial waste, and 
plastics waste. For the waste and recycling industry of the Global North, National Sword’s 
apparent focus on smuggling appeared to target the illegal end of the waste market. That 
assessment, however, soon proved very wide of the mark: a top leaders’ meeting in April 
2017 announced that China would significantly reduce both its categories and volume of 
scrap imports. Almost immediately exporters reported import fees doubling, and major 
challenges in trying to get material into China. By July the WTO had been informed of a ban 
on 24 categories of material, including plastics and mixed paper. Even for categories not 
named in the ban, in October 2017 China raised the threshold to 0.5% contaminants. This 
threshold is beyond the capability of the mechanical materials recovery infrastructure in the 
Global North, so it amounts to a ban in all but name. Subsequent announcements in 2018 
extended the ban to include most categories of recovered materials hitherto exported to 
China.  
The result has been a twin-pronged crackdown; on the import of what the Chinese 
government describes as ‘foreign garbage’ and on parts of China’s secondary processing 
industry. The label ‘foreign garbage’ mobilises environmental justice campaigns and binds 
them to the nationalist agenda in Xi’s ‘Beautiful China’ campaign. Those NGO campaigns 
made China a poster child for environmental pollution. That representation is increasingly 
discordant with the Chinese government’s understanding of China’s place in the global 
world order. The outcome is a crackdown on those industries that enable and depend on 
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‘foreign garbage smuggling’, that is labour-intensive forms of secondary processing, and the 
promotion instead of what are seen to be modern, ‘clean and green’ (qingjie shengchan and 
luse fazhan) capital-intensive technologies of materials recovery offering ‘ecological 
modernisation’ (shengtai xiandaihua).   
Contemporaneous with, and allied to, the drive to ecological modernisation has been the 
promotion of circular economy ideals of closed loop materials circulation. In respect of e-
waste, to take just one sector, the Circular Economy Promotion Law (2008) has seen the 
development of a form of extended producer responsibility (EPR), in which the government 
charges fees on Chinese manufacturers which are then used to subsidise state-certified 
(formal) recycling companies (Inverardi-Ferri, 2017a). In accordance with industrial ecology 
principles, electrical and electronics manufacturers are encouraged by law to create their 
own recycling plants (Schulz, 2015). Scrappage policies, notably the “Home Appliance Old-
for-New Rebate Program” (jiadian yi jiu huan xin zhengce) (2009-11), which sought to boost 
domestic consumption post the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, required used goods to go to 
state-certified recycling companies rather than the informal sector (Inverardi-Ferri, 
2017a).The former are capital-intensive and typically located in an eco-park, not in the 
existing secondary processing agglomerations. There is some doubt as to their efficacy when 
compared to the productivity of those established agglomerations; doubly so, given the 
incentives are to scrap goods and recycle materials rather than recondition and reuse them 
(Schulz 2018).  
To date, academic literature discussing the crackdown on labour intensive secondary 
processing in China has focused upon the displacement of previously tolerated informal, 
recycling in major cities (Tong & Tao, 2015; Inverardi-Ferri, 2017b; Schulz 2018). Whilst the 
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informal waste markets of cities have been one target of recent Chinese policy, another is 
the secondary processing agglomerations reliant on globally sourced imports. These 
agglomerations have been most affected by the Green Fence and National Sword. Import 
licenses have been revoked or severely restricted, and there have been widespread delays 
in moving shipments through the ports, with knock-on consequences for onward markets 
and supply chains. Policy has starved these agglomerations of feedstock, rendering it 
unpredictable and highly volatile. The response, however, is not the intended disappearance 
but rather capital shift and geographical displacement. In early 2018, the trade press was 
reporting that Chinese plastics re-processors had shifted operations to Vietnam, Malaysia 
and Thailand, where they are stated as producing materials to standards that meet Chinese 
acceptance criteria (www.resource-recycling.com – 3 April 2018). It is entirely possible, 
then, that the recent uplift (from a small base) in scrap imports by these states is indicative 
of the conjuncture of the mobility of certain fractions of Chinese capital (specifically traders, 
entrepreneurs and low capital technology) with the relatively lax  waste import regimes of 
other states in South-east Asia.  
China’s Green Fence and National Sword policies are but the most recent demonstration 
that waste and recycling are highly political markets, framed by policies that disallow some 
practices (dumping, polluting or burning) whilst incentivising others (e.g. scrapping or 
recycling) that configure both costs and (potential) resources. These markets indicate that 
the scale of analysis for waste and recycling is not confined to the household, the city or the 
national but is framed globally and characterised by connections and interdependences. We 
therefore consider the wider reverberations of China’s ban, with a focus on the EU and 
particularly the UK – the member state hitherto most heavily reliant on exports to China.  
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The case of UK municipal waste in light of the China ban 
To understand why China’s ban reverberates with such force in the UK, it is necessary to 
outline particularities of its municipal waste infrastructure, which in turn account for its 
dependence on the Chinese market.  
Current waste infrastructure in the UK 
EU-level policy embraced the Basel Convention and endeavoured to keep wastes generated 
within the EU within its own boundaries – although the leakiness of wastes across those 
borders, licitly and illicitly, is well established and evidenced by global trade. Simultaneously, 
it developed a preferential way of classifying options for dealing with waste materials, from 
landfill at the bottom, through incineration, and recycling/recovery, to re-use and 
reconditioning and waste prevention at the top – the ‘Waste Hierarchy’. That hierarchy was 
incentivised financially, through fines applied to member states whose performance did not 
match rising targets.  
In the UK this meant a dramatic shift, starting in the 1990s, from a historic reliance on 
landfill. Unlike the situation in Sweden, say, where public trust in incineration led to the 
development of a waste infrastructure of municipal combined heat and power, in the UK 
public opposition to energy-from-waste plants (‘incinerators’) led to a Waste Strategy (2002) 
that sought to divert waste materials from landfill to recovery for recycling. Mostly, and in 
line with the marketization of public sector services in the UK, this involved local 
government establishing public-private partnerships for municipal waste management. 
Local authorities contracted out their waste services to commercial firms, who, in handling 
municipal waste, guaranteed to achieve an agreed percentage diversion of waste from 
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landfill to recycling. The means to that diversion is capital intensive technology – in most 
cases a materials recovery facility, which is an industrial plant, which sorts materials into 
specific types and (a limited number of) categories. So, plastic from paper, paper from card, 
plastic and paper from glass.  
The upshot was that tonnage diversion from landfill was the primary policy metric, and 
waste in the UK was economized and financialised on the basis of weight (Gregson et al. 
2015). In accounting terms, what mattered for UK policy was to demonstrate the weight of 
material diverted from waste (landfill) by being recovered for recycling. Translated into a 
commercial operating environment, that meant that UK materials recovery plants were 
designed to process large amounts of garbage, separating it rapidly into materials types. 
This (crude) sorting valorises wastes in terms of quantity rather than material quality 
(defined in terms of low percentages of contaminants). Significantly, this means such 
reclaimed materials are only of interest to those who either are using low quality inputs or 
can undertake further, laborious reprocessing and sorting. Hence the UK came to depend on 
exporting low quality waste to China: for instance, in 2016, the UK collected ~8m tonnes of 
paper fibre, of which over 60% was exported, with 47% going to China (Recycling 
Association, 2018).    
As the reconfiguration of waste through circular economy thinking has gained traction in 
European policy, alongside moral economies of the proximity principle and geostrategic 
concerns over resource security, there is an increasing focus on circulating high quality 
recyclates within the EU. The nature of the UK’s municipal waste infrastructure  with its 
‘comingled collection’ systems, poor quality outputs and reliance on global export markets 
were all singled out for high level political criticism – not least because, in their dependence 
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on the global trade in wastes, they undermined the political attempt to create a European 
circular economy (Gregson et al. 2015). Brexit may offer new options in a dispute that can 
be seen as the latest European waste controversy where the UK is positioned as “the dirty 
man (sic) of Europe”. But, now the China Ban, and the removal of the UK’s primary waste 
export market, changes the options available.   
The emerging municipal waste crisis in the UK – a crisis of economization 
The implications of China’s ban for the UK’s municipal waste infrastructure are far-reaching. 
In the short term it has resulted in the physical accumulation of material in facilities, the sale 
of material down (not up) the Waste Hierarchy (i.e. instead of recycling there is energy 
reclamation, and in some instances, allegedly, landfill) and attempts to improve the quality 
of materials emanating from materials recovery facilities. The latter involves increased 
levels of manual labour, or ‘dirty work’ of the type that ‘clean and green’ ecological 
modernisation was meant to eliminate (Gregson et al. 2016). In the UK, much of that labour 
is performed by migrant workers, who, post Brexit, may be unavailable. Beyond the short 
term, however, this is a crisis of municipal waste’s economization. Currently, it manifests 
around questions of financialisation and governance.  
The crisis in financialisation is signalled by intense discussion within the sector on contracts 
(www.letsrecycle – 23 March 2018, Webinar – 26 April 2018). The capital intensive MRFs 
were funded on the basis of long contracts (10 to 15 years or longer) to recoup costs in what 
seemed a low risk market with a guaranteed supply and growing demand. The sudden 
removal of the Chinese market disrupts the second assumption at a stroke whilst the 
additional reprocessing to reduce contamination increases operating costs.  At the time of 
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writing (June 2018), commercial operators are calling for contract renegotiation and better 
risk sharing between the commercial sector and local authorities, but whether local 
authorities, whose budgets have been slashed by years of austerity, have the capacity to 
take on more of the financial risk is, to say the least, debateable.  
Looking to the future, it is not inconceivable that some firms will walk away from contracts 
and investments. Should they do so then local authorities will have a full blown public waste 
crisis on their hands. In the interim, the ability of local authorities to control the kind of 
waste generated by their populations is in capital’s cross hairs. When commercial operators 
publicly declare that they are “neither alchemists nor magicians” and state their refusal to 
engage with recycling collections that are 30% contaminated, they are firmly laying the 
blame for the UK’s poor quality recyclates with consumers and local authorities who fail to 
crack down on their publics’ poor recycling practices.  What remains tacit here is the process 
of economization that underpins the UK’s municipal waste infrastructure. This has 
converted a statutory public service into a private asset capitalised through unpaid 
household labour (that in the UK has to be cajoled into sorting waste into even rough 
categories e.g. landfill, recyclables and (sometimes) organic food waste), least cost 
collection systems that move that more-or-less sorted material from households and 
businesses to facilities, which then sort that material, but only sufficiently to produce low 
grade materials sold into the commodity markets. To turn that infrastructure into a system 
for producing quality recovered materials will require nothing short of a write-off of existing 
systems of collection and of capital plant, and their replacement with technologies and 
labour that treat, rather than merely sort, materials. Small wonder, then, that capital is 
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currently positioning the UK municipal waste crisis as a failure of local authority governance 
rather than of municipal waste’s economization.    
Future Directions 
By way of conclusion we offer suggestions for future research.  
There is a need for empirical research in three areas. Firstly, to revise the map of secondary 
resource flows and establish the new spatial fix for resource recovery. Experience shows 
that, given the poor data reporting over ‘waste’ (to put it benignly), this needs on-the-
ground work beyond official data. Figures show UK exports of plastic scrap to Malaysia, 
trebled in the four months post the ban, and those to Pakistan rose by 78%, to Vietnam 
50%, to India 37% and Indonesia 19% (Independent 16 June 2018). That emergent 
geography however, is likely an under-estimate of actual flows and fluid in its geographical 
specifics. In Vietnam the shipping press reports not only that ‘a dramatic increase in scrap-
laden containers’ forced Ho Chi Minh City’s Cat Lai port to stop receiving plastic and paper 
waste on 1 June (due to 8,000 twenty foot equivalent of uncollected shipping containers of 
scrap cargo) but also that they were lacking valid permits, so they may be on top of 
recorded flows (Loadstar, 8 June 2018).  Further, in late June 2018, shipping lines were 
notified that neither Vietnam nor Thailand would accept recycled plastic cargo imports – 
effectively banning these (declared) imports from parts of South-east Asia 
(www.rebnews.com – 22 June 2018). Second, there is a need for work in China to address 
the secondary processing zones that hitherto have been dependent upon globally sourced 
imports. How are these zones restructuring in the light of the ban? To what extent is 
Chinese capital in the recycling sector going offshore? Is this a matter of the off-shoring of 
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labour intensive resource recovery to proximate states in South east Asia? Are materials 
then actually still entering China – or, are they being sold globally? Simultaneously, there is 
a need to chart the progress (or not) of China’s drive to harness domestic waste streams to 
establish a circular economy. To what extent is the drive for formalisation succeeding? Some 
indications suggest that, as in the West, formal capital intensive recycling may be 
dismantling and sorting materials but is outsourcing the difficult reprocessing, possibly away 
from coastal import sites to less visible, less developed locations in the interior (Schulz 
2018). Third, it will be necessary to examine the crises in municipal waste governance in the 
Global North that have been set in train by China’s ban. The UK may be the most affected of 
the European states, but at the time of writing there are parallel crises emerging elsewhere. 
In the US for instance, within two months of the ban, Oregon alone had already approved 
waivers to dump 6,107 tons of erstwhile recycling (Allington 2018; c.f. CBC – 27 December, 
2017), while New Zealand has seen increased exports to South East Asia but still recyclers 
have said they are ‘sitting on a massive amount of paper and plastics’ (Radio NZ 5 April 
2018).  
There is also a need to move away from the Northern-centric imaginaries that have 
dominated research in the field. Rather than starting with the wastes of the Global North 
and seeing China as a receiving point or dumping ground, recent events have shown China 
to be the motor here; the world view therefore needs to be, if not China-centric, then with 
China at its centre. Yet there is a need to go beyond recycling economies to connect to 
debates over resource scarcity/security. At the same time as the trade press is reporting the 
geographical displacement of Chinese capital invested in resource recovery into proximate 
states in South east Asia, parallel reports indicate different fractions of Chinese capital 
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looking to invest in secondary materials recovery and processing in the Global North 
(www.resource-recycling.com – 3 April 2018). Of course, looking to invest is not inward-
investment, but – should such investment begin to occur – it would indicate, that China’s 
resource base is shifting to encompass urban mining on a global scale. It may be premature 
to talk of China’s global urban mine but that new form of resource imperialism, in which the 
Global North is not just harvested but becomes the materials recovery location for ‘Made in 
China’, is the possibility that comes into view  from a China-centred account.  
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